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(Parts one, two and three of my interview with James Poulos.)
Q. In your writing on foreign policy, you've been quite convicted about
two things -- that the United States cannot afford to have Russia as an
enemy, and that a better world depends in part on a more muscular
France. Neither nation is likely to top a list of countries that
concern the average American. What is it that makes them so crucially
important?
There's a real elephant in the room when it comes to our awkward and crucial relationship with Russia. Freddie DeBoer of The League of Ordinary Gentlemen,
turning a nice phrase, once suggested we call the acknowledgment of
problems like these 'giving the elephant a peanut'. So here's my
peanut: bad relations with Russia make us feel so uncomfortable because
they challenge and undermine our most cherished narratives about the
moral and social progress of the global white community. I know even
suggesting that we think analytically in terms of an 'international
white race' sets off alarms, but it's obvious that Russian disinterest
in, or outright hostility to, liberal political norms is noteworthy
primarily because virtually every other majority-white country in the
world has embraced and institutionalized them. We (small-l) liberals
recoil at the very idea that any white person could seriously
appreciate or even live under a regime like Russia's, because this is a
reminder that white people are not the charmed winners of Earth's
civilizational marathon -- contestants who can rest easy now that
they've completed the course and won the race
It's revealing, of course, that the person who wrote the book on how history had ended for white people
was Japanese-American. Implicit in the promise that history had ended
for white people was the idea that human History would thenceforth be
driven by the post-racial -- or even post-human -- spread of de-historization
around the world. This is the kind of paradox that leads us to confuse
democratization and liberalization, the spread of war and social unrest
with the spread of enlightenment and peace, and so on. I'm not blaming
Francis Fukuyama or 'the neocons' or anyone else in particular for this
turn of thought -- our radical and reactionary critics are correct to point out its inevitability from the standpoint of the neoliberal
project. But it is revealing that the fall of the Soviet empire, which
touched off this race-transcendent white triumphalism, allowed all too
many of us to skip over the challenge of integrating Russia and
its neighboring states into the 'global white community'. The Clinton
administration's attempt to do this by economic proxy -- to integrate
by capitalist ordeal -- has to be considered one of the all-time worst
failures of US foreign policy. But admittedly we allowed ourselves few
alternate tools. Precious few policymakers viewed the fall of Communism
as an occasion for the return of Christendom. And although we feel
guilty about it, our deep-seated skepticism over the ability of
long-undemocratic and anti-liberal regimes to quickly develop a vibrant
American-style civil society is not ill-founded.
So good relations with Russia are important because writing off
Russia as a kooky nationalistic foe allows us to all-too-conveniently
keep ignoring this sensitive but real set of issues. There's one other
reason why they're important: we can't secure vital American interests
around the world with Russia as an enemy. Full stop. When you boil it
right down, this is true because Europe won't function as the sort of
counterweight we would need, in addition to allies like India,
in order to manage an actively adversary Russia. I do think it's
essential that Europe recover the ability to defend and assert its own
interests, and to take its own side in an argument, but not in order to
'put the Russian bear at bay' or any such colorful metaphor. Europe
simply is adrift, confused, unsure, weak, and weakening. The Europeans
have finally figured out how to neutralize the contending powers that
have driven them to war so many times. But to neutralize should not be
to neuter. Europe cannot survive as we know and like it -- as thriving
and powerful culture and a wealthy, stable civilization -- unless it
gathers around and follows the lead of a ruling vision of the highest,
a vision that Europe can incarnate in institutional form. Despite the
brilliant moral history of a people like the Poles, neither Poland,
Germany, Italy, Spain, nor any other country but one can truly lead
Europe. Only France has the economic, political, and cultural
credibility, drawn from its venerable history and ideals, to organize
the European identity and direct it toward the confident, worthy, and
practical goals that Europe requires to endure.
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